Ítem


Legal probabilism: an epistemological dissent

Susan Haack, University of Miami, organizes her lecture in the following points: 1. Standards of proof are best understood as degrees of warrant. 2. Degrees of warrant aren’t mathematical probabilities. 3. Commonwealth v. Sacco and Vanzetti: epistemology trumps probability theory. 4. People v. Collins: epistemology trumps probability again

2090.mp4 2090.mp3

Universitat de Girona. Grup de Recerca en Filosofia del Dret

Autor: Haack, Susan
Data: 26 maig 2011
Resum: Susan Haack, University of Miami, organizes her lecture in the following points: 1. Standards of proof are best understood as degrees of warrant. 2. Degrees of warrant aren’t mathematical probabilities. 3. Commonwealth v. Sacco and Vanzetti: epistemology trumps probability theory. 4. People v. Collins: epistemology trumps probability again
2090.mp4 2090.mp3
Format: video/H263
audio/mpeg
Cita: Haack, S. (2011). Legal probabilism: an epistemological dissent. A ’Standards of proof and scientific evidence’. Girona: Universitat. [Consulta 3 juny 2011]. Disponible a: http://hdl.handle.net/10256.1/2090
Accés al document: http://hdl.handle.net/10256.1/2090
Llenguatge: eng
Editor: Universitat de Girona. Grup de Recerca en Filosofia del Dret
Col·lecció: Standards of proof and scientific evidence
Drets: Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència Creative Commons: Reconeixement – No comercial – Compartir igual (by-nc-sa)
URI Drets: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/es/deed.ca
Matèria: Prova (Dret) -- Congressos
Dret -- Filosofia -- Congressos
Evidence (Law) -- Congresses
Law -- Philosophy -- Congresses
Títol: Legal probabilism: an epistemological dissent
Tipus: info:eu-repo/semantics/lecture
Repositori: DUGiMedia

Matèries

Autors