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Endorsement, Reasons and Intentional Action

Moran’s conception of self-knowledge, in his book Authority and Estrangement, is connected to an extremely rationalistic conception of intentional action. I will argue that this rationalistic commitment can be avoided without renouncing the most basic aspects in his account of self-knowledge

THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 2007, vol. 22, núm. 58, p. 25-33

Universidad del País Vasco

Autor: Prades, Josep Lluís
Data: 2007
Resum: Moran’s conception of self-knowledge, in his book Authority and Estrangement, is connected to an extremely rationalistic conception of intentional action. I will argue that this rationalistic commitment can be avoided without renouncing the most basic aspects in his account of self-knowledge
Format: application/pdf
ISSN: 0495-4548 (versió paper)
2171-679X (versió electrònica)
Accés al document: http://hdl.handle.net/10256/10746
Llenguatge: eng
Editor: Universidad del País Vasco
Col·lecció: Reproducció digital del document publicat a: http://dx.doi.org/10.1387/theoria.479
Articles publicats (D-FS)
És part de: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 2007, vol. 22, núm. 58, p. 25-33
Drets: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain
URI Drets: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
Matèria: Intencionalitat (Filosofia)
Intentionality (Philosophy)
Coneixement d’un mateix, Teoria del
Self-knowledge, Theory of
Raonament
Reasoning
Títol: Endorsement, Reasons and Intentional Action
Tipus: info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Repositori: DUGiDocs

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