DUGi

Group Strategy-Proofness in private good economies

http://dugi.udg.edu/item/http:@@@@hdl.handle.net@@10256@@13171

Many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only strategyproof, but also group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition, hence diminishing the traditional conflict between incentives and efficiency. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost sharing, house allocation, and auctions, in spite of the substantive disparity between these cases. In a general framework encompassing all of them, we prove that the equivalence between the two forms of strategy-proofness is due to an underlying common structure that transcends the many differences between the contexts and the mechanisms for which it holds. (JEL C78, D44, D63, D71, D82)

Barberà acknowledges support from the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075), and grants “Consolidated Group-C” ECO2008-04756 and FEDER, ECO2014-53051-P, and SGR2014-515. Berga acknowledges the support from grants ECO2010-16353, ECO2013-45395-R, SGR2009-0189, and 2014-SGR-1360. Moreno acknowledges support from grants SEJ4941, SEJ-5980, ECO2011-29355, and ECO2014-53767

info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO//ECO2013-45395-R/ES/BIENESTAR, MECANISMOS DE ASIGNACION Y POLITICAS PUBLICAS/

American Economic Association