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Group Strategy-Proofness in private good economies

Many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only strategyproof, but also group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition, hence diminishing the traditional conflict between incentives and efficiency. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost sharing, house allocation, and auctions, in spite of the substantive disparity between these cases. In a general framework encompassing all of them, we prove that the equivalence between the two forms of strategy-proofness is due to an underlying common structure that transcends the many differences between the contexts and the mechanisms for which it holds. (JEL C78, D44, D63, D71, D82)

Barberà acknowledges support from the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075), and grants “Consolidated Group-C” ECO2008-04756 and FEDER, ECO2014-53051-P, and SGR2014-515. Berga acknowledges the support from grants ECO2010-16353, ECO2013-45395-R, SGR2009-0189, and 2014-SGR-1360. Moreno acknowledges support from grants SEJ4941, SEJ-5980, ECO2011-29355, and ECO2014-53767

info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO//ECO2013-45395-R/ES/BIENESTAR, MECANISMOS DE ASIGNACION Y POLITICAS PUBLICAS/

American Economic Association

Manager: Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (Espanya)
Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Espanya)
Generalitat de Catalunya. Agència de Gestió d’Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca
Author: Barberà, Salvador
Berga, Dolors
Moreno, Bernardo
Abstract: Many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only strategyproof, but also group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition, hence diminishing the traditional conflict between incentives and efficiency. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost sharing, house allocation, and auctions, in spite of the substantive disparity between these cases. In a general framework encompassing all of them, we prove that the equivalence between the two forms of strategy-proofness is due to an underlying common structure that transcends the many differences between the contexts and the mechanisms for which it holds. (JEL C78, D44, D63, D71, D82)
Barberà acknowledges support from the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075), and grants “Consolidated Group-C” ECO2008-04756 and FEDER, ECO2014-53051-P, and SGR2014-515. Berga acknowledges the support from grants ECO2010-16353, ECO2013-45395-R, SGR2009-0189, and 2014-SGR-1360. Moreno acknowledges support from grants SEJ4941, SEJ-5980, ECO2011-29355, and ECO2014-53767
Format: application/pdf
Document access: http://hdl.handle.net/10256/13171
Language: eng
Publisher: American Economic Association
Collection: info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1257/aer.20141727
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/0002-8282
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MICINN//ECO2010-16353/ES/BIENESTAR SOCIAL Y REGULACION DE MERCADOS/
AGAUR/2009-2014/2009 SGR-189
AGAUR/2014-2017/2014 SGR-1360
Is part of: info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO//ECO2013-45395-R/ES/BIENESTAR, MECANISMOS DE ASIGNACION Y POLITICAS PUBLICAS/
Rights: Tots els drets reservats
Subject: Elecció social -- Models matemàtics
Social choice -- Mathematical models
Title: Group Strategy-Proofness in private good economies
Type: info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Repository: DUGiDocs

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