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Group Strategy-Proofness in private good economies

Many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only strategyproof, but also group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition, hence diminishing the traditional conflict between incentives and efficiency. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost sharing, house allocation, and auctions, in spite of the substantive disparity between these cases. In a general framework encompassing all of them, we prove that the equivalence between the two forms of strategy-proofness is due to an underlying common structure that transcends the many differences between the contexts and the mechanisms for which it holds. (JEL C78, D44, D63, D71, D82)

Barberà acknowledges support from the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075), and grants “Consolidated Group-C” ECO2008-04756 and FEDER, ECO2014-53051-P, and SGR2014-515. Berga acknowledges the support from grants ECO2010-16353, ECO2013-45395-R, SGR2009-0189, and 2014-SGR-1360. Moreno acknowledges support from grants SEJ4941, SEJ-5980, ECO2011-29355, and ECO2014-53767

info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO//ECO2013-45395-R/ES/BIENESTAR, MECANISMOS DE ASIGNACION Y POLITICAS PUBLICAS/

American Economic Association

Director: Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (Espanya)
Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Espanya)
Generalitat de Catalunya. Agència de Gestió d’Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca
Autor: Barberà, Salvador
Berga, Dolors
Moreno, Bernardo
Data: 1 abril 2016
Resum: Many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only strategyproof, but also group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition, hence diminishing the traditional conflict between incentives and efficiency. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost sharing, house allocation, and auctions, in spite of the substantive disparity between these cases. In a general framework encompassing all of them, we prove that the equivalence between the two forms of strategy-proofness is due to an underlying common structure that transcends the many differences between the contexts and the mechanisms for which it holds. (JEL C78, D44, D63, D71, D82)
Barberà acknowledges support from the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075), and grants “Consolidated Group-C” ECO2008-04756 and FEDER, ECO2014-53051-P, and SGR2014-515. Berga acknowledges the support from grants ECO2010-16353, ECO2013-45395-R, SGR2009-0189, and 2014-SGR-1360. Moreno acknowledges support from grants SEJ4941, SEJ-5980, ECO2011-29355, and ECO2014-53767
Format: application/pdf
Accés al document: http://hdl.handle.net/10256/13171
Llenguatge: eng
Editor: American Economic Association
Col·lecció: info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1257/aer.20141727
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/0002-8282
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MICINN//ECO2010-16353/ES/BIENESTAR SOCIAL Y REGULACION DE MERCADOS/
AGAUR/2009-2014/2009 SGR-189
AGAUR/2014-2017/2014 SGR-1360
És part de: info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO//ECO2013-45395-R/ES/BIENESTAR, MECANISMOS DE ASIGNACION Y POLITICAS PUBLICAS/
Drets: Tots els drets reservats
Matèria: Elecció social -- Models matemàtics
Social choice -- Mathematical models
Títol: Group Strategy-Proofness in private good economies
Tipus: info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Repositori: DUGiDocs

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