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In Defense of Weird Hypotheticals

Professor Allen (this issue) critiques the value of using “weird” hypotheticals to mine intuitions about legal systems. I respond by supporting the value of “thin” hypotheticals for providing information about how people reason generally, rather than for revealing peoples’ specific answers. I note that because legal systems are the products of many minds thinking about how other minds operate, the object of inquiry is metacognition—that is, understanding how reasoning works

Marcial Pons

Universitat de Girona. Càtedra de Cultura Jurídica

Autor: Spellman, Barbara A.
Data: 1 juliol 2020
Resum: Professor Allen (this issue) critiques the value of using “weird” hypotheticals to mine intuitions about legal systems. I respond by supporting the value of “thin” hypotheticals for providing information about how people reason generally, rather than for revealing peoples’ specific answers. I note that because legal systems are the products of many minds thinking about how other minds operate, the object of inquiry is metacognition—that is, understanding how reasoning works
Format: application/pdf
Accés al document: http://hdl.handle.net/10256/19283
Llenguatge: eng
Editor: Marcial Pons
Universitat de Girona. Càtedra de Cultura Jurídica
Col·lecció: info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i2.22477
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/2660-4515
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/eissn/2604-6202
Drets: Reconeixement 4.0 Internacional
URI Drets: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Títol: In Defense of Weird Hypotheticals
Tipus: info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Repositori: DUGiDocs

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