Ítem


Prices versus exams as strategic instruments for competing universities

In this paper we investigate the optimal choice of prices and/or exams by universities in the presence of credit constraints. We first compare the optimal behavior of a public, welfare maximizing, monopoly and a private, profit maximizing, monopoly. Then we model competition between a public and a private institution and investigate the new role of exams/prices in this environment. We find that, under certain circumstances, the public university may have an interest to raise tuition fees from minimum levels if it cares for global welfare. This will be the case provided that (i) the private institution has higher quality and uses only prices to select applicants, or (ii) the private institution has lower quality and uses also exams to select students. When this is the case, there are efficiency grounds for raising public prices

Universitat de Girona. Departament d’Economia

Altres contribucions: Universitat de Girona. Departament d’Economia
Autor: Rey Canteli, Elena del
Romero, Laura
Data: octubre 2004
Resum: In this paper we investigate the optimal choice of prices and/or exams by universities in the presence of credit constraints. We first compare the optimal behavior of a public, welfare maximizing, monopoly and a private, profit maximizing, monopoly. Then we model competition between a public and a private institution and investigate the new role of exams/prices in this environment. We find that, under certain circumstances, the public university may have an interest to raise tuition fees from minimum levels if it cares for global welfare. This will be the case provided that (i) the private institution has higher quality and uses only prices to select applicants, or (ii) the private institution has lower quality and uses also exams to select students. When this is the case, there are efficiency grounds for raising public prices
Format: application/pdf
Cita: Rey, E. del; Romero, L. Prices versus exams as strategic instruments for competing universities. Girona: Universitat de Girona. Departament d’Economia, 2004. (DOcuments de treball, 12). Necessita Adobe Acrobat. Disponible a Internet a: http://hdl.handle.net/10256/285
Altres identificadors: DL Gi.472-2002
Accés al document: http://hdl.handle.net/10256/285
Llenguatge: eng
Editor: Universitat de Girona. Departament d’Economia
Col·lecció: info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/1579-475X
Drets: Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència Creative Commons: Reconeixement – No comercial – Sense obra derivada (by-nc-nd)
URI Drets: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/deed.ca
Matèria: Educació -- Avaluació
Títol: Prices versus exams as strategic instruments for competing universities
Tipus: info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
Repositori: DUGiDocs

Matèries

Autors