Ítem
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Amor, Daniel R.
Fort, Joaquim |
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| 2011 | |
| We deal with a system of prisoner’s dilemma players undergoing continuous motion in a two-dimensional plane. In contrast to previous work, we introduce altruistic punishment after the game. We find punishing only a few of the cooperator-defector interactions is enough to lead the system to a cooperative state in environments where otherwise defection would take over the population. This happens even with soft nonsocial punishment (where both cooperators and defectors punish other players, a behavior observed in many human populations). For high enough mobilities or temptations to defect, low rates of social punishment can no longer avoid the breakdown of cooperation | |
| application/pdf | |
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1539-3755 (versió paper) 1550-2376 (versió electrònica) |
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| http://hdl.handle.net/10256/7624 | |
| eng | |
| American Physical Society | |
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Reproducció digital del document publicat a: http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.84.066115 Articles publicats (D-F) |
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| © Physical Review E, 2011, vol. 84, núm. 6, p. 066115 | |
| Tots els drets reservats | |
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Jocs -- Models matemàtics
Games -- Mathematical models |
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| Effects of punishment in a mobile population playing the prisoner’s dilemma game | |
| info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| DUGiDocs |
