脥tem
Pineda Oliva, David | |
Universitat de Girona. Departament de Filosofia | |
Artiga Galindo, Marc | |
16 setembre 2013 | |
Naturalistic theories of intentional content aim at explaining the phenomenon of representation in naturalistic terms: what kind of relation is a representational relation? What grounds the fact that certain states qualify as representations and some do not? What determines representational content? In my dissertation, I provide an original naturalistic theory of representational content along the lines of teleosemantics and use it in order to solve several questions related to cognition. So my thesis is divided into two main parts. The goal of the first part of the project was to provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a state to be endowed with representational content and, in the second part, I apply this naturalistic framework to cognition, focusing on perception and concepts Les teories naturalistes del contingut intencional intenten explicar el fenomen de la representaci贸 en termes naturalistes: Quin tipus de relaci贸 茅s la relaci贸 de representaci贸? Qu猫 fonamenta el fet que alguns estats siguin representacions i d鈥檃ltres no? Qu猫 determina el contingut representacional? A la meva tesi, defenso una original teoria naturalista del contingut intencional des d鈥檜na perspectiva teleosem脿ntica i l鈥檜so per solucionar un conjunt de problemes relacionats amb la cognici贸. Per tant, la meva tesi est脿 dividida en dues parts principals; l鈥檕bjectiu de la primera part 茅s de donar un conjunt de condicions necess脿ries i suficients perqu猫 un estat tingui contingut intencional i, en la segona part, aplico aquest esquema a la cognici贸, amb especial inter猫s en la percepci贸 i els conceptes |
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application/pdf | |
http://hdl.handle.net/10803/123436 | |
eng | |
Universitat de Girona | |
Filosofia i psicologia | |
A naturalistic theory of intentional content | |
doctoralThesis | |
TDX |