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Sales restriction, quality selection and the mode of competition

A regulator imposing “sales restrictions” on firms competing in oligopolistic markets may enhance quality provision by the firms. Moreover, for most restrictions levels, the impact on quality selection is invariant to the mode of competition

Universitat de Girona. Departament d’Economia

Altres contribucions: Universitat de Girona. Departament d’Economia
Autor: Boccard, Nicolas
Wauthy, Xavier
Resum: A regulator imposing “sales restrictions” on firms competing in oligopolistic markets may enhance quality provision by the firms. Moreover, for most restrictions levels, the impact on quality selection is invariant to the mode of competition
Accés al document: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/14648
Llenguatge: eng
Editor: Universitat de Girona. Departament d’Economia
Drets: Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència Creative Commons: Reconeixement – No comercial – Sense obra derivada (by-nc-nd)
URI Drets: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/deed.ca
Matèria: Oligopolis -- Models economètrics
Títol: Sales restriction, quality selection and the mode of competition
Tipus: info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
Repositori: Recercat

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