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Endorsement, Reasons and Intentional Action

Moran’s conception of self-knowledge, in his book Authority and Estrangement, is connected to an extremely rationalistic conception of intentional action. I will argue that this rationalistic commitment can be avoided without renouncing the most basic aspects in his account of self-knowledge

Universidad del País Vasco

Author: Prades, Josep Lluís
Abstract: Moran’s conception of self-knowledge, in his book Authority and Estrangement, is connected to an extremely rationalistic conception of intentional action. I will argue that this rationalistic commitment can be avoided without renouncing the most basic aspects in his account of self-knowledge
Document access: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/252410
Language: eng
Publisher: Universidad del País Vasco
Rights: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain
Rights URI: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
Subject: Intencionalitat (Filosofia)
Intentionality (Philosophy)
Coneixement d’un mateix, Teoria del
Self-knowledge, Theory of
Raonament
Reasoning
Title: Endorsement, Reasons and Intentional Action
Type: info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Repository: Recercat

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