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Proving Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Attribute Auctions

Proving the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in auction mechanism design. In this paper we discuss the strategy proofness of a multi-attribute auction mechanism using three different approaches: the analysis of the mechanism properties, a mathematical analysis to determine if agents can take advantage of dishonest strategies and the use of simulations to study the behaviour of bidders

This research project has been partially funded through the projects labeled TIN2008- 04547 and DPI2011-24929, and BR10/18 Scholarship of the University of Girona granted to Albert Pla

Universitat de Girona. Institut d’Informàtica i Aplicacions

Autor: Pla Planas, Albert
López Ibáñez, Beatriz
Murillo Espinar, Javier
Resum: Proving the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in auction mechanism design. In this paper we discuss the strategy proofness of a multi-attribute auction mechanism using three different approaches: the analysis of the mechanism properties, a mathematical analysis to determine if agents can take advantage of dishonest strategies and the use of simulations to study the behaviour of bidders
This research project has been partially funded through the projects labeled TIN2008- 04547 and DPI2011-24929, and BR10/18 Scholarship of the University of Girona granted to Albert Pla
Accés al document: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/294748
Llenguatge: eng
Editor: Universitat de Girona. Institut d’Informàtica i Aplicacions
Drets: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain
URI Drets: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
Matèria: Subhastes -- Models matemàtics
Auctions -- Mathematical models
Títol: Proving Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Attribute Auctions
Tipus: info:eu-repo/semantics/report
Repositori: Recercat

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