Ítem
| Artiga Galindo, Marc | |
| Mendelovici (forthcoming) has recently argued that (1) tracking theories of mental representation (including teleosemantics) are incompatible with the possibility of reliable misrepresentation and that (2) this is an important difficulty for them. Furthermore, she argues that this problem commits teleosemantics to an unjustified a priori rejection of color eliminativism. In this paper I argue that (1) teleosemantics can accommodate most cases of reliable misrepresentation, (2) those cases the theory fails to account for are not objectionable and (3) teleosemantics is not committed to any problematic view on the color realism-antirealism debate | |
| http://hdl.handle.net/2072/295251 | |
| eng | |
| Universidade de Lisboa | |
| Tots els drets reservats | |
|
Filosofia de la ment
Philosophy of mind Representació (Filosofia) Representation (Philosophy) |
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| Reliable misrepresentation and teleosemantics | |
| info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| Recercat |
