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Endorsement, Reasons and Intentional Action

Moran’s conception of self-knowledge, in his book Authority and Estrangement, is connected to an extremely rationalistic conception of intentional action. I will argue that this rationalistic commitment can be avoided without renouncing the most basic aspects in his account of self-knowledge

Universidad del País Vasco

Autor: Prades, Josep Lluís
Resum: Moran’s conception of self-knowledge, in his book Authority and Estrangement, is connected to an extremely rationalistic conception of intentional action. I will argue that this rationalistic commitment can be avoided without renouncing the most basic aspects in his account of self-knowledge
Accés al document: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/295952
Llenguatge: eng
Editor: Universidad del País Vasco
Drets: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain
URI Drets: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
Matèria: Intencionalitat (Filosofia)
Intentionality (Philosophy)
Coneixement d’un mateix, Teoria del
Self-knowledge, Theory of
Raonament
Reasoning
Títol: Endorsement, Reasons and Intentional Action
Tipus: info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Repositori: Recercat

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