Ítem
Amor, Daniel R.
Fort, Joaquim |
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5 juny 2018 | |
We deal with a system of prisoner’s dilemma players undergoing continuous motion in a two-dimensional plane. In contrast to previous work, we introduce altruistic punishment after the game. We find punishing only a few of the cooperator-defector interactions is enough to lead the system to a cooperative state in environments where otherwise defection would take over the population. This happens even with soft nonsocial punishment (where both cooperators and defectors punish other players, a behavior observed in many human populations). For high enough mobilities or temptations to defect, low rates of social punishment can no longer avoid the breakdown of cooperation | |
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/320280 | |
eng | |
American Physical Society | |
Tots els drets reservats | |
Jocs -- Models matemàtics
Games -- Mathematical models |
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Effects of punishment in a mobile population playing the prisoner’s dilemma game | |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
Recercat |