Item


Reliable misrepresentation and teleosemantics

Mendelovici (forthcoming) has recently argued that (1) tracking theories of mental representation (including teleosemantics) are incompatible with the possibility of reliable misrepresentation and that (2) this is an important difficulty for them. Furthermore, she argues that this problem commits teleosemantics to an unjustified a priori rejection of color eliminativism. In this paper I argue that (1) teleosemantics can accommodate most cases of reliable misrepresentation, (2) those cases the theory fails to account for are not objectionable and (3) teleosemantics is not committed to any problematic view on the color realism-antirealism debate

Universidade de Lisboa

Author: Artiga Galindo, Marc
Date: 2018 June 5
Abstract: Mendelovici (forthcoming) has recently argued that (1) tracking theories of mental representation (including teleosemantics) are incompatible with the possibility of reliable misrepresentation and that (2) this is an important difficulty for them. Furthermore, she argues that this problem commits teleosemantics to an unjustified a priori rejection of color eliminativism. In this paper I argue that (1) teleosemantics can accommodate most cases of reliable misrepresentation, (2) those cases the theory fails to account for are not objectionable and (3) teleosemantics is not committed to any problematic view on the color realism-antirealism debate
Document access: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/320613
Language: eng
Publisher: Universidade de Lisboa
Rights: Tots els drets reservats
Subject: Filosofia de la ment
Philosophy of mind
Representació (Filosofia)
Representation (Philosophy)
Title: Reliable misrepresentation and teleosemantics
Type: info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Repository: Recercat

Subjects

Authors