Ítem


Creença i realitat en William James

This paper is devoted to analyse both the epistemology and ontology of James’s pragmatism and his metaphysical proposals. The conclusions are: first, that James did not defend a metaphysical realism, but a antirealist realism; and secondly that this position was what he needed to defend the possibility of human freedom and religious experience

Societat de Filosofia del País Valencià

Autor: Defez, Antoni
Data: 5 juny 2018
Resum: This paper is devoted to analyse both the epistemology and ontology of James’s pragmatism and his metaphysical proposals. The conclusions are: first, that James did not defend a metaphysical realism, but a antirealist realism; and secondly that this position was what he needed to defend the possibility of human freedom and religious experience
Accés al document: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/320956
Llenguatge: cat
Editor: Societat de Filosofia del País Valencià
Drets: Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Spain
URI Drets: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/es/
Matèria: Realitat
Reality
Creença i dubte
Belief and doubt
Pragmatisme
Pragmatism
James, William, 1842-1910
Religió -- Filosofia
Religion -- Philosophy
Títol: Creença i realitat en William James
Tipus: info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Repositori: Recercat

Matèries

Autors